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ABSTRACT 
Science and Technology Parks (STPs) are one of the most important innovation policy 
initiatives. Previous studies show that location in a park promotes cooperation for innovation, 
but do not investigate whether this cooperation produces better results. We extend this literature 
by analysing the effect of location on an STP on the results of cooperation for innovation and 
the mechanism facilitating this effect. We rely on a much larger sample of firms and STPs than 
previous studies, and, where necessary, account for selection bias and endogeneity. The 
results show that location in an STP increases the likelihood of cooperation for innovation, and 
the intangible benefits of cooperation with the main innovation partner, due mainly to a more 
diverse relationship. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Agglomerations of firms, universities and other knowledge-intensive organizations are beneficial 
for the generation and utilization of knowledge (Ponds et al., 2010; Boschma and Frenken, 
2011). This has been used to justify the development of science parks, technology parks, 
science and technology parks, technopoles, innovation centres, research parks, science-based 
industrial parks, university research parks, as a component of public policy to stimulate 
innovation. These initiatives can be encompassed by the broad category of Science and 
Technology Parks (STPs) since they are all policy-driven and have a main common objective to 
promote cooperation and technology transfer, especially between firms and knowledge 
providers such as universities and research institutes (Hogan, 1996, Bigliardi et al., 2006). 
Previous academic research mostly analyses the effect of location in an STP on firms’ results 
and behaviour (Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2005; Fukugawa, 2006; Squicciarini, 2008). While the 
effect on results is unclear, the empirical evidence shows that the likelihood of cooperation for 
innovation between firms and knowledge providers increases. However, most existing studies 
use very small samples of firms and STPs.  
The present work extends this literature in a number of ways. First, it focuses on analysing the 
influence of STPs on the results of cooperation, how STP effects are channelled, and how much 
they increase the likelihood of cooperation.  
Second, it uses a substantially larger sample of firms and exploits the responses from a 
standard Community Innovation Survey (CIS) type questionnaire to evaluate the influence of 
STPs on cooperation. This allows the use of already tested covariates that capture the 
innovation behaviour of firms. This study relies on the 2007 Spanish Survey of Technological 
Innovation in Companies, undertaken by the Spanish Institute of Statistics (INE), and includes 
39,722 companies which are representative of the size, sector and regional location of the 
population of Spanish companies, 653 of which are located in 22 of the 25 Spanish STPs. 
Third, it takes account of endogeneity and sample selection bias problems. The former problem 
arises because firms are not randomly located in a STP: their location is the result of the firm’s 
decision and the STP’s agreement, and these decisions rely on partially unobservable factors. 
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The latter problem arises if the subsamples used are not representative of the population being 
analysed. 
Fourth, it provides evidence for the Spanish case. STPs are a major Spanish innovation policy 
initiative; the first STPs were created in the 1980s and their number has grown considerably 
since then. Nevertheless, evidence on their performance is scarce (Vásquez-Urriago et al., 
2014). 
Our results show that, even after accounting for endogeneity, STPs are important for fostering 
cooperation for innovation. We find also that the intangible outputs from cooperation are higher 
for park firms for the main reason that their location facilitates the development of more diverse 
cooperative relationships. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous arguments on the effect of 
proximity on cooperation behaviour, summarizes the empirical evidence on the role of STPs on 
cooperation, and provides a description of the Spanish context. Section 3 explains the 
methodological issues related to the empirical work; Section 4 presents the results of our 
analysis of the effect of STPs on the likelihood of cooperation; and Section 5 focuses on the 
effect of STPs on the results of cooperation and the main drivers of this effect. Section 6 
presents the conclusions. 
 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
We first review the literature on the relationship between proximity and cooperation for 
innovation more generally before focusing on the more specific literature on STPs and 
cooperation for innovation. Finally, we provided a detailed description of Spanish STPs. We 
adopt an explicit interdisciplinary perspective since the main scholarly arguments on these 
topics come from various disciplines such as economics, geography, management and 
innovation studies.  
2.1. Proximity and cooperation for innovation 
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The agglomeration of knowledge intensive organizations traditionally was considered a source 
of innovation (Marshall, 1890; Jacobs, 1970), but it was not until the early 1990s that research 
has focused on this effect in particular (Feldman and Kogler, 2010). An important reason for the 
influence of agglomeration on innovation is that agglomeration favours the initiation and 
development of linkages between different organizations (Baptista, 1998; Hervas-Oliver and 
Albors-Garrigos, 2009). The likelihood of establishing relationships is higher for firms in 
agglomerations; geographical proximity increases the chances of casual meetings and 
conversations that identify common interests and may lead to joint projects (Guillain and Huriot, 
2001).  
There is a lack of agreement about why relationships between co-located partners work better 
(Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; Dahl and Pedersen, 2004; Giuliani, 2007; Ibrahim et al., 2009). This 
debate is based on two main arguments. First, geographical proximity facilitates knowledge 
flows and, as a result, learning processes because closeness has a positive effect on the 
number of interactions (Torre and Gilly, 2000). Since tacit knowledge plays an important role in 
innovation processes (Polanyi, 1966), and frequent and repeated face-to-face contacts are key 
to its transmission (Baptista, 1998; Amin and Wilkinson, 1999), geographical proximity is a 
facilitator. Maskell and Malmberg (1999) argue that the higher the tacit component of the 
knowledge, the more important is geographical proximity for knowledge to flow between 
partners. Accordingly, innovation partnerships among firms in agglomerations should achieve 
higher flows of knowledge due to the more diverse relationships they enable.  
Second, geographical proximity reduces uncertainty; it reduces search costs (Feldman, 1999) 
and increases the likelihood of explicit search for innovation partners (MacPherson, 1997). Also, 
it contributes to the building of trust which reduces the transaction costs involved in joint 
projects and results in more stable and longer lasting relationships (Bennet et al., 2000; Love 
and Roper, 2001). Longer relationships encourage the sharing of more valuable knowledge, 
resulting in a better adjustment between expectations and results, greater trust and increasing 
returns from collaboration (Izushi, 2003; Abramovsky and Simpson, 2011), especially in relation 
to intangible results (Barge-Gil and Modrego, 2011).  
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However, geographical proximity is necessary, but not sufficient for effective inter-organizational 
learning (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Following Knoben and Oerlemans (2006, p.80), other types 
of proximity may be relevant for cooperation: technological proximity, defined as ´the level of 
overlap of the knowledge bases of two collaborating actors` (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998) and 
organizational proximity, defined as ´the set of routines –explicit or implicit- which allows 
coordination without having to define beforehand how to do so. The set of routines incorporates 
organizational structure, organizational culture, performance measurements systems, language 
and so on` (Rallet and Torre, 1999) This broader notion of proximity influences the frequency 
and density (variety and duration) of interactions (Baptista, 1998; Torre and Gilly, 2000) 
2.2. STPs and cooperation for innovation 
STPs guarantee geographical proximity and encourage other types of proximity that fosters 
cooperation between firms and research and technology organizations. 
Several empirical studies, focusing mainly on firm-university links, analyse the role of STPs on 
cooperation for innovation. Table 1 presents two main groups of studies. The first group is 
composed of case studies of STPs, which investigate whether location in an STP fosters  
university-industry links, inter-firm links and other links. These works analyse the behaviour of 
park firms and find that they frequently develop links with universities, other firms and other 
institutions. 
The studies in the second group are mostly quantitative. They use matching techniques to 
develop a control group of off-park firms to allow the effect of location in a park to be estimated 
or they use comparative analysis. The evidence tends to show a positive effect of location in an 
STP on collaboration with local universities and firms. However, these studies mostly do not 
control for endogeneity of park location. The decision to locate in an STP might be related to the 
propensity to cooperate and these firms would have cooperated for innovation wherever they 
were located. This is an important consideration which could bias results. The exception is the 
study by Fukugawa (2006), which finds that STP location has an effect on firms’ links with 
universities and is not restricted to local universities.  
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To sum up, these studies provide evidence that location in a park promotes cooperation for 
innovation. However, none of this work investigates the influence of an STP location on the 
results of cooperative projects. These results fall into the two groups (Barge-Gil and Modrego, 
2011) of economic results (including sales, exports costs, profits, employment, internal R&D or 
productivity) and intangible results (including increased ability to formulate strategies, enhanced 
human resources and better management of information and relationships). Analysing the 
influence of STP location on the results of cooperative projects is the main focus of the present 
analysis. 
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Table 1: Studies analysing STPs and cooperation for innovation 
Method Study Country         Samplei Variables of cooperation Results 
C
as
e 
st
ud
y 
Vedovello 
(1997) UK 1 STP 
links between park firms and the host university: 
- informal links (personal contacts, attendance at 
seminars, access to literature and equipment, etc.) 
- human resources links (sponsored student projects, 
recruitment of graduates, scientists and engineers, 
etc.)   
- formal links (research contracts, joint research, 
analysis and testing, etc.)  
Significant  presence of  informal and 
human resources links in park firms 
Phillimore 
(1999) Australia  1 STP 
links between park firms and the host university 
(cf Vedovello, 1997) 
links between park firms (joint research, shared 
equipment, commercial transactions, social 
interaction) 
Significant presence of both types of links in park 
firms    
Bakouros et al. 
(2002) Greece 3 STPs 
links between park firms and local universities (cf 
Vedovello, 1997) 
links between park firms (cf Phillimore, 1999)  
Significant  presence of informal and 
human resources links (firm-university) in all cases 
and of formal links in STPs 
Links (between firms) in commercial transactions 
and social interaction 
Brčić et al. 
(2010) Croatia 5 STPs 
links between Park firms and others firms 
 
Significant presence of links with firms within the 
own STP and with off-park firms 
Basile  
(2011) Italy 15 STPs 
links between Park firms and: universities, other 
firms, research centres, central and local 
government, venture capital institutions 
 
Significant presence of all types of links in Park 
firms, especially with universities and small 
technology firms    
 8 
M
at
ch
in
g 
or
 C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
An
al
ys
is
 
Monck et al. 
(1988) United Kingdom 
183 park firms / 
101 off park 
firms 
links between firms and local universities (informal 
contact, employment of academics, sponsor research, 
recruitment of graduates, training, access to 
equipment, test / analysis, etc.) 
 
effect (+) of park location on informal contact and 
access to equipment (but not on more formal links) 
Westhead and 
Storey (1995) United Kingdom 
183 park firms / 
101 off park 
firms and 47 
park firms / 48 
off park firms)  
links between firms and local universities  
 effect (+) of park location on links in general 
Löfsten 
and  
Lindelöf (2002, 
2003, 2005); 
Lindelöf and 
Löfsten (2004)   
Sweden                 
134 park NTBFsII 
/ 139 off park 
firms 
links between firms and local universities 
(R&D projects, basic and applied research, 
consultancy, discussions, equipment, R&D 
documents, recruitments, etc..) 
 
Effect (+) of park location on all links. 
 
Among park NTBFs, more frequent links among 
academic NTBFs than corporate NTBFs 
Colombo and 
Delmastro 
(2002) 
Italy 45 park NTBFs / 45 off park firms 
formal links between firms and universities 
formal links between firms’ clients - suppliers and 
other firms 
(commercial agreements, technological agreements) 
Effect (+) of park location on total links (in general) 
and on links with universities 
Malairaja and 
Zawdie (2008) Malaysia 
22 park HT 
SMEsIII / 30 off 
park firms 
links between firms and local universities (informal 
contact, projects, employment of academics and 
consultancy, equipment, collaborative research) 
More links in park firms, but no significant effects of 
park location 
Radosevic and 
Myrzakhmet 
(2009) 
Kazakhstan 25 Park firms / 25 off Park firms Links between firms and universities Less links in Park firms 
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Díez and 
Fernández 
(2015) 
Spain 
480 Park firms / 
9466 off Park 
firms 
links between firms and: universities, other 
institutions  
 
Significant  presence of links 
M
at
ch
in
g 
an
d 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
Fukugawa 
(2006) Japan      
74 park NTBFs / 
138 off park 
firms 
Joint research between firms and HEIsIV 
 
Joint research between firms and local HEIs 
Effect (+) of park location on joint research with 
HEIs, although research partner of park firms 
unlikely to be in the same region 
 
I number of parks analysed in case studies, and number of companies in other studies 
II NTBF – New Technology Based Firm 
III HT SMEs – High Tech Small and Medium Enterprises 
IV HEIs – Higher Education Institutions 
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2.3. STPs in Spain 
Spanish parks are a relatively recent phenomenon. Since the 1980s, STPs have been seen as 
initiatives that contribute to regional development via technology transfer and revitalization and 
diversification of the local industry. Efforts have been made to attract high-tech, often 
multinational firms to strengthen the dynamics of the local economic environment (Ondategui, 
2001; Infyde iD, 2008). Spanish parks were originally technology rather than science parks. 
However, over the years, both new and existing parks have forged stronger relationships with 
universities via different mechanisms such as formal collaborative agreements, direct location of 
some research institutes within the park, or even entrance of universities on park property; 
Accordingly, they became Science and Technology Parks. Parks tend to specialize in 
innovation, knowledge creation and the transmission and promotion of collaboration between 
park and non-park actors (Infyde iD, 2008). Spanish STPs have also worked to create regional 
networks of STPs, aimed at strengthening regional systems of innovation (Romera, 2006).  
Regarding the role played by the government, Spanish STPs were usually created through 
regional initiatives and, by the 1990s, had spread to the majority of Spanish regions. This 
resulted in their receiving support from national government1 in the form of national funding to 
purchase specialized equipment, develop the infrastructure and conduct R&D projects. STPs 
are seen as playing a key role in the national innovation system and are included in national 
R&D plans. Nevertheless, regional government support for STPs is still relevant. 
It could be argued that in the 1990s Spanish STPs were closer to the ‘second generation’ of 
parks (OECD, 2011) since they were aimed at fostering regional industry, were located in urban 
environments and focused on the creation of new firms. In the 2000s, Spanish STPs have 
evolved towards the ‘third generation’, growing larger due to national support, and specializing 
in specific knowledge areas. 
The development of Spanish STPs has some similarities with developments in other 
Mediterranean countries such as France and Italy. These STPs have three common 
characteristics. First, the parks are centrally planned and established as part of a regional 
                                                 
1 Financial support from central government for the period 2000-2003 amounted to €300 million (Infyde iD, 
2008) and increased to around €400 million over the 2004-2007 period (Spanish Ministry of Science and 
Innovation). 
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development policy. Second, their objectives go beyond R&D activities and involve programmes 
to improve production methods, general organization practices, etc. Third, although there is 
usually a university component in the STP structure, universities do not lead or control STP 
activities (Ondategui, 2001; Roure et al., 2005). These characteristics differentiate Spanish 
STPs from those established in the US, the UK and northern Europe. 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA  
The empirical work is divided in two parts. First, we analyse the effect of location in an STP on 
the likelihood of formal cooperation for innovation and on the results from formal collaboration 
agreements. Second, we examine how this effect emerges.2  
Methodologically, we rely on the treatment evaluation literature, so that park firms are the 
treated group and non-park firms are the untreated group. We estimate the Average Treatment 
Effect (ATE), understood as the expected effect of treatment on an individual drawn randomly 
from the population (Wooldridge, 2002). The ATE is the expected difference in outcomes, with 
and without treatment (i.e. the expected difference between outcomes for the same firm, located 
in or outside a park). 
This framework allows underlying assumptions to be made explicit. For example, when using 
mean differences between park and non-park firms to analyse the park effect, the underlying 
assumption is that location in an STP is completely random, which is an unrealistic 
assumption.3 We make two alternative assumptions about the ways in which park and non-park 
firms differ, which allows us to determine whether different outcomes can be attributed to a park 
location rather than other firm characteristics.  
First, if we assume that it is possible to observe the different characteristics of park and non-
park firms, we can use a regression with controls (Equation I) or a regression with a propensity 
score4 (Equation II): 
     
                                                 
2 Investigation of the results of agreements is limited to relationships between firms and external sources 
of knowledge. 
3 On the one hand, firms decide whether they want to be located in an STP and, on the other, STPs 
usually have some conditions for belonging.  
4 The control variables are replaced by the estimated probability, according to these control variables, of 
the firm being located in an STP. 
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where Y  is an indicator of firm cooperation, SSTP  indicates location in an STP, X  are 
covariates suggested by the previous literature (see Table 2), )(ˆ Xp is the estimated 
propensity score, and αˆ is the ATE. 
 
Second, if we suspect that some of the (non-random) differences between firms inside and 
outside parks are not observable, we need to apply alternative methods such as a control 
function approach (Equation III) or instrumental variables with propensity score (Equation IV):  
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Where φ  is the normal density function  and Φ  is the normal distribution function (evaluated 
using the term in parenthesis which corresponds to the estimation obtained from a probit 
model5). σρˆ is the estimated coefficient of the so-called hazard; it acts as a control function to 
eliminate inconsistency in the standard regression, absorbing the correlation between treatment 
and the error term. 
uXPTSSY
m
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5 nn X´γ  is the probit estimation of ,*
1
210 vZXSSTP
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=
γγγ  where *SSTP  is latent variable, 
which depends on the covariates X and on Z , which acts as an exclusion restriction. 
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where PTSS ˆ is the estimated treatment using the propensity score6 as an instrument; and αˆ is 
the ATE.7 
 
The data were extracted from the 2007 Spanish Survey of Technological Innovation in 
Companies undertaken by INE. This annual survey is modelled on the CIS. The sample 
population is 39,722 companies, representative of the size, sector and regional location of the 
population of Spanish companies.8 The survey includes a question on location in a STP. 
 
All Spanish STPs included in our analysis are registered under the Association of Science and 
Technology Parks of Spain (APTE), created in 1989. APTE includes only STPs that fulfil the 
following characteristics: ownership of physical space and infrastructure to support innovation; 
provision of training and support for the development of knowledge based firms; formal 
cooperation with universities and research centres; and a managing organization responsible 
for technology transfer. These conditions exclude from APTE spontaneous clusters (i.e. clusters 
with no established managing organization) and industrial parks that are neither technology 
oriented nor related to a scientific institution. Hence, our focus on the STPs belonging to the 
APTE considerably reduces the heterogeneity among our units of analysis. In 2007, APTE 
included 25 STPs and more than 3,800 firms and related entities.   
Accordingly, we constructed a dichotomous variable (SSTP) that takes the value 1 if the 
company is located in an STP belonging to APTE, and 0 otherwise: 653 companies (1.64% of 
the sample) are located in a Spanish STP.9 The appendix to the survey includes questions on 
the characteristics of cooperation with the firm’s main innovation partner. The responses to 
these questions allow deeper analysis of the influence of STP location on cooperation results. 
 
                                                 
6 In this case the propensity score is the estimated probability of the firm being located in an STP in 
function of the control variables and an instrumental variable. 
7 For more methodological details, see Wooldridge (2002) and Vásquez-Urriago et al., (2014). 
8 The specific characteristics of this sample are available on the INE webpage: 
http://www.ine.es/dynt3/metadatos/es/RespuestaDatos.htm?oe=30061. Data were analysed in secure 
environments at INE. Access to confidential information was not provided; e.g. we do not know the names 
or addresses of firms.  
9 These firms are located in 22 of the 25 STPs in Spain that were included in the APTE in 2007. 
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4. LOCATION IN AN STP AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF COOPERATION FOR INNOVATION 
The dependent variable for the first part of the empirical analysis is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the firms engaged in formal collaboration for innovation during the period 2005-
2007, and zero otherwise:10 4,695 firms (11.8% of total sample) were involved in a formal 
collaboration. The definition of a formal cooperative agreement follows the definition in the 
OECD Oslo Manual.11 Potential partners include suppliers, customers, competitors, consultants 
and private knowledge intensive business firms, universities, public research centres and 
technology institutes.12  
Several firm specific factors have been shown to influence the likelihood of cooperation for 
innovation. CIS data have been used to analyse what determines the likelihood of cooperation 
for innovation, and several controls have been found to be relevant for explaining cooperation. 
Barge-Gil (2010) provides a review of these studies and the indicators used. These covariates 
should be included to avoid biased results (because they also may be correlated with STP 
location). In addition, their inclusion improves estimation precision. Thus, we include the general 
characteristics of firms (size, belonging to a group, export intensity, dummy for new firms, 
incidence and technology level of the sector) and the characteristics of the innovation process 
(innovation effort, and cost and information obstacles). Table 2 provides definitions of the 
variables and Table 3 provides summary statistics. 
                                                 
10 The survey asked firms whether they had engaged in innovation activities in the period. Only those firms 
responding positively (regardless of the success of these efforts) are considered potential candidates for 
cooperation, i.e. firms that do not engage in innovation activity do not cooperate for innovation. 
11 Innovation co-operation involves active participation in joint innovation projects with other organizations. 
These may be other enterprises or non-commercial institutions. The partners need not derive immediate 
commercial benefit from the venture. Contracting-out of work that does not involve active collaboration is 
not considered to be co-operation. Co-operation is distinct from sourcing open information, and acquisition 
of knowledge and technology, in that all the parties involved must take an active part in the work (OECD 
and Eurostat, 2005, p.79) 
12 We do not distinguish partner location. On the one hand, our main interest is in analysing the ‘general’ 
cooperation pattern of firms, i.e., their ability to enter in and benefit from cooperative agreements. On the 
other hand, the survey does not provide information on partner locations so we do not know whether 
partners are located in the park or elsewhere. Related evidence from an official survey of STP firms shows 
that 628 out of 776 (81%) cooperating STP firms cooperate with organizations in the same STP; so we can 
assume that most cooperative links observed are intrapark links. However, this is an issue that deserves 
further exploration. (For more information on this survey, see www.idi.mineco.gob.es.) 
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Table 2: Definition of covariates 
General Company Characteristics 
Company size Total turnover in 2005 (in logarithmic: natural logarithm of (1+indicator)). The square of this variable is also included. 
Exporting behaviour  Share of export per total turnover in 2005. 
Group Dummy variable: 1 if the company is part of a group. 
Newly established Dummy variable: 1 if the company was established in 2005-2007. 
Merged Dummy variable: 1 if turnover increased by 10% or more as a result of a merger with another company during 2005-2007.  
Downsized Dummy variable: 1 if turnover decreased by 10% or more owing to the sale or closure of part of the company during 2005-2007. 
Technological level 
of sectors of activity  
7 dummy variables: high-tech manufacturing, medium-high-tech 
manufacturing, medium-low-tech manufacturing, low-tech 
manufacturing, knowledge intensity service, no-knowledge intensity 
service, other sectors.I 
Companies` Innovation Activity 
Innovation effort Expenditure on innovation activities in 2007 (‘000 euros per employee). 
Cost obstacles  
Average measure of importance of the following factors as barriers to 
innovation during 2005-2007: lack of internal funds, lack of sources of 
finance, high costs of innovating, market dominated by established 
enterprises.II  
Information 
obstacles 
Average importance of the following factors as barriers to innovation 
during 2005-2007: lack of qualified personnel, lack of information on 
technology, lack of information on the markets, problems finding 
cooperation partners.II  
I Classification of manufacturing and services (OECD, 2005). Other sectors: agriculture; extractive 
activities; production and distribution of electricity, gas and water; construction. 
II Importance ranked on the scale from 1(crucial) to 4 (unimportant).The indicator is equal to [n / ∑ factors 
importance] 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
General Company Characteristics 
Company size 13.71 4.64 0 24.65 
Company size^2 209.55 83.75 0 607.91 
Exporting behaviour  0.031 0.117 0 1 
Group 0.263 0.440 0 1 
Newly established 0.040 0.196 0 1 
Merged 0.018 0.133 0 1 
Downsized 0.016 0.129 0 1 
Technological level of sectors of activity:      
high-tech manufacturing  0.026 0.162 0 1 
medium-high-tech manufacturing  0.097 0.296 0 1 
medium-low-tech manufacturing  0.135 0.341 0 1 
low-tech manufacturing  0.166 0.372 0 1 
knowledge intensity service 0.111 0.314 0 1 
no-knowledge intensity service 0.345 0.475 0 1 
other sectors 0.118 0.323 0 1 
Companies` Innovation Activity     
Innovation effort 4.47 29.83 0 4460 
Cost obstacles  0.444 0.207 0.25 1 
Information obstacles 0.377 0.161 0.25 1 
# of observations 39722 
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Table 4 presents the results. The first row shows the percentage of park and non-park firms 
cooperating for innovation: 45% of park firms and 11% of off-park firms cooperate.  
The second and third rows show the results of the regressions with controls (Equation I) and 
propensity score (Equation II). Estimations were performed using probit and Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). The results show that the effect of STP location is positive and significant, 
regardless of the estimation method used. The likelihood of cooperation increases by some 16-
18 percentage points for the average firm (17-20 points for the median firm). 
The fourth and fifth rows show the results for the control function (Equation III) and the 
instrumental variables with propensity score approaches (Equation IV).13 Both methods require 
an additional variable (instrument) related to the likelihood of being located in a STP (inclusion 
restriction), but not the likelihood of cooperation (exclusion restriction). We use an indicator for 
the supply or ‘availability’ of space in an STP: the percentage of firms located in an STP in the 
firm’s region.14 This variable is calculated based on information from the APTE on the number of 
firms in each park, and data published in the Central Companies Directory (DIRCE) based on 
the regional business census.  
We would expect this variable to comply with both restrictions. On the one hand, it has a 
positive effect on the propensity to locate in a park.15 On the other hand, the availability of STPs 
in the firms’ region is not per se a significant explanatory factor for firm cooperation for 
innovation. In addition, this variable is exogenous to the firm since firm mobility across regions 
is very low.  
                                                 
13 We performed two tests for exogeneity; the results did not allow us to reject the endogeneity 
assumption. We followed the procedure described in Wooldridge (2003, p.483) and performed a Hausman 
test to compare the coefficients of the OLS and the two-stage OLS (2SLS) regressions. The results are 
presented in the Appendix. 
14 Alternatively, we used the number and dimensions (in m2) of the STPs in each region; the results did not 
change. 
15 The first-stage F-statistic test (Staiger and Stock,1997) confirms that this instrument is strong (F = 
157.85, see Bascle, 2008, p.295-296 for details of this test), i.e. is strongly correlated with SSTP. 
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Table 4: ATE estimation of location in Spanish STPs, on cooperation for innovation 
Dependent variable  Cooperation I 
Estimation Method Companies in an STP 
Companies 
outside  an STP Difference 
Mean differences 45.02 11.26 33.75a  (0.012) 
 OLS 
Probit II 
Mean Median 
Regression with controls (Equation I) 0.22a (0.012) 0.16a (0.018) 0.20a (0.021) 
Regression with propensity score (Equation II) 0.21a (0.012) 0.18a (0.020) 0.17a (0.019) 
Control function (Equation III) 0.21a (0.007) 0.15a (0.000) 0.16a (0.000) 
IV with propensity score (Equation IV) 0.80a (0.087) 0.16 (0.103) 0.21c (0.125) 
# of observations 39722 
Icooperation = dummy: cooperation for innovation in 2005-2007.  
II Marginal effects shown in probit models.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
a p-value lower than 0.01, c p-value lower than 0.10. 
All controls from table 2 are included in the regressions. 
 
Both methods confirm the previous results. Location in an STP positively influences the 
probability of cooperation. Also, the size of the effect is similar: around 15-16 percentage points 
using the control function approach, and 16-21 percentage points using the instrumental 
variables method.16 
The results for the control variables are presented in Table 5. They are mainly in line with the 
findings summarized in Barge-Gil (2010). Size, exporting, being part of a group, technological 
level of the industry, innovation effort and obstacles are all positively related to the probability of 
cooperation. 
                                                 
16 Probit estimations with instrumental variables give consistent coefficient estimations, but not consistent 
standard errors (Adkins, 2012). This explains the non-significance of the effect when using probit with 
instrumental variables, despite its similar size. This problem does not arise with OLS and the coefficients 
are significant. 
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Table 5: Results for control variables for likelihood of cooperation 
Dependent variable Cooperation I 
Estimation Method Regression with 
controls (Equation I) 
Control function 
(Equation III) 
IV with propensity 
score (Equation IV) 
G
en
er
al
 C
om
pa
ny
 C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
Company size -0.08a (0.00) -0.08a (0.00) -0.08a (0.00) 
Company size ^2 II 0.005a (0.00) 0.005a (0.00) 0.005a (0.00) 
Exporting behaviour 0.68a (0.06) 0.68a (0.06) 0.67a (0.06) 
Group 0.33a (0.02) 0.33a (0.02) 0.32a (0.02) 
Newly established 0.23a (0.04) 0.22a (0.04) 0.21a (0.05) 
Merged 0.04 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06) 0.04 (0.06) 
Downsized -0.31a (0.07) -0.30a (0.07) -0.31a (0.07) 
low-tech manufacturing -0.50a (0.04) -0.53a (0.05) -0.49a (0.05) 
medium-low-tech 
manufacturing -0.45
a (0.04) -0.48a (0.05) -0.44a (0.06) 
medium-high-tech 
manufacturing -0.20
a (0.04) -0.23a (0.05) -0.19a (0.05) 
knowledge intensity 
service 0.09
b (0.04) 0.09b (0.04) 0.09c (0.04) 
no-knowledge intensity 
service  -0.64
a (0.04) -0.67a (0.04) -0.63a (0.05) 
other sectors -0.59a (0.05) -0.61a (0.05) -0.57a (0.06) 
In
n.
 A
ct
. Innovation effort 0.004a (0.00) 0.008a (0.00) 0.008a (0.00) 
Cost obstacles 0.94a (0.04) 0.94a (0.04) 0.93a (0.05) 
Information obstacles 0.15b (0.06) 0.16a (0.06) 0.15b (0.06) 
Constant -1.54a (0.05) -1.55a (0.06) -1.54a (0.06) 
Chi2 3684.89a 3459.66a 3809.75a 
# of observations 39722 
Icooperation = dummy: cooperation for innovation in 2005-2007. 
II Size effect is mainly positive as the minimum likelihood of cooperation is reached for values around 
1,327€-1.524€ in firms’ sales. 
High technology manufacturing is used as baseline category. 
Equation II uses the propensity score instead of control variables  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
a p-value lower than 0.01, b p-value lower than 0.05, c p-value lower than 0.10. 
 SSTP is included in every regression. 
 
5. LOCATION IN AN STP AND THE RESULTS FOR COOPERATION FOR INNOVATION 
We have shown that location in an STP increases the likelihood of cooperation for innovation. In 
this section, we analyse whether cooperation yields better results for firms located in an STP 
and examine the potential reasons for this17. 
5.1. Data and variables definition  
The data in this section are from an Appendix to the Spanish CIS Survey introduced in 2007. It 
contains questions addressed only to cooperating firms that declared that their main innovation 
                                                 
17 For a review on the general effects of cooperation for innovation see, for example, Barge-Gil (2013). 
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partner in the period 2005-2007 was an External Knowledge Source (EKS). EKS include the 
following types of partners: universities, public research centres, technology institutes and 
private knowledge intensive services providers. The focus on EKS in this study is justified 
because one of the main purposes of STPs is increasing the flows of knowledge between EKS 
(especially, but not exclusively universities) and on-park firms. The questions in the Appendix 
relate exclusively to the main partner, which reduces the attribution problem faced by empirical 
studies that analyse cooperation more generally (Barge-Gil and Modrego, 2011) . 
The Appendix questions were responded by 1,820 firms (38.8% of firms cooperating in the 
2005-2007 period), 150 of which are located in STPs (i.e. 51% of STP cooperating firms). They 
asked about the characteristic of the relationship with the main innovation partner (e.g. length of 
the relationship, and types of activities) and about the intangible and economic results obtained 
(see Table 6). Firms were asked to evaluate the results on a Likert scale.18  
We constructed average values and first factor indicators based on this information: 
- Average value of intangible results from cooperation with the main innovation partner (Effects); 
- Average value of economic results from cooperation with the main innovation partner 
(Impacts); 
- First factor19 from the intangible results for cooperation with the main innovation partner 
(Fac_Effects); 
- First factor from the economic results for cooperation with the main innovation partner 
(Fac_Impacts). 
 
                                                 
18 Where 0 = absence of impact, 1 = low impact, 2 = intermediate impact, 3 = high impact. Likert scales 
have been criticized because they introduce measurement error induced by subjective responses (Levin et 
al., 1987). These indicators were tested by comparing the quantitative responses in the case of economic 
results (Barge-Gil and Modrego, 2011). The results were very similar suggesting that use of a Likert scale 
is not affecting the results. Also, we used average values and factor analysis to check the robustness of 
results to different methods of aggregating the information obtained from the Likert scores. 
19 We conducted principal component analysis and extracted the first factor. All 8 intangible results were 
included. A similar strategy was followed for the economic results.  
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Table 6: Indicators for results from cooperation for innovation  
Intangible results from cooperation for innovation  
Strategies 
Enhanced ability to define and plan innovation activities (effect1) 
Better market understanding (effect2) 
Human 
Resources 
Learning and staff training in new areas (effect3) 
Enhanced ability for teamworking and knowledge sharing (effect4) 
Information 
management 
Enhanced  ability to retrieve and use information (effect5)  
Improved relationship between firm’s R&D and other departments (effect6) 
Relationships 
management 
Improved utilization of other ESK (effect7) 
Improved access to public programs of public funding for innovation (effect8) 
Economic results from cooperation for innovation  
Sales  (impact1) 
Exports (impact2) 
Production costs (impact3) 
Profits (before taxes) (impact4) 
Employment (impact5) 
Internal R&D (impact6) 
Productivity (impact7) 
 
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for these indicators. On average, firms consider the 
impact on the economic results of their main partner to be quite low, and the impact on 
intangible results to be low to intermediate.  
To understand why cooperation might produce different results for park and off-park firms, we 
defined two additional variables to capture the arguments proposed in the literature. 
First, diversity of the relationship (Diversity) is measured as the number of different activities 
engaged in during the period analysed. The activities considered are: training, laboratory testing 
services, technological consultancy, managerial consultancy and research and development 
and the indicator is in the range 1 to 6. Second, length of the relationship (Length) is measured 
as the number of years since the cooperation started (in logs)20 (see Table 7).  
                                                 
20 This variable had 20 missing values. We checked whether the results were sensitive to the exclusion of 
these observations and we found them to be very similar. 
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Table 7: Summary statistics. Composite indicators for results and characteristics of 
cooperation for innovation  
 Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Effects 1.49 0.64 0 3 
Fac_Effects 2.48e-09 1 -2.29 2.30 
Impacts 1.14 0.62 0 3 
Fac_Impacts -2.31e-09 1 -1.78 2.95 
Diversity  2.80 1.32 1 6 
Length 1.32 0.80 0 4.20 
# of observations 1820  
 
5.2 Location in an STP and the results for collaboration for innovation with an EKS    
The aim is to estimate the effect of location in an STP; therefore, we use the set of control 
variables from Table 2. Cooperation characteristics are not included; because they are likely to 
be affected by location in a park so their inclusion would invalidate interpretation of the 
coefficient of STP as the ATE (Wooldridge, 2003; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). However, they 
may explain the effects of a park location, which is something we explore later.21 
We need to account of sample selection bias. The sample in this case is a selected sample 
based on the firms that responded to the Appendix questions, and whose main innovation 
partner is an EKS. We account for this issue by employing a Heckman estimation. To identify 
the model, we used regional supply of EKS.22 The Mills ratio is insignificant and we found no 
evidence of sample selection.23  
In relation to endogeneity, previous studies suggest that, if a subsample of innovators is used, 
STP location is no longer endogenous (Vásquez-Urriago et al., 2014). We applied the same 
instrument as before and the Hausman test did not reject the exogeneity hypotheses, thus, our 
choice of OLS estimation (i.e. we estimate only equations I and II).24  
                                                 
21 It is possible that other covariates (e.g. innovation effort) are also affected by STP location. What 
matters is the ceteris paribus effect that we want to estimate. We are interested in whether the effect of 
cooperation is the same, inside and outside an STP, for firms with similar characteristics (e.g. innovation 
effort). The total effect of STP location on cooperation results will be higher if innovation effort is increased 
by STP location and positively affects results. 
22 We used information from CRUE and Eurostat to build two indicators: regional university income from 
applied research, over regional gross internal product and regional employment in R&D industries (CNAE 
digit 73) over total regional employment. 
23 Heckman estimations are available upon request from the authors. 
24 The test might fail meaning that endogeneity cannot be ruled out completely, but since we have no 
evidence of it, we decided to employ OLS because our sample is now smaller and the loss of precision 
caused by an instrumental variables approach would be important. 
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Table 8 presents the results. The first three rows show the mean values for intangible and 
economic results related to park and non-park firms. The values are higher for firms in STPs 
(1.68 vs 1.47 for Effects and 1.27 vs 1.13 for Impacts). The fourth and fifth rows show the 
results of the regressions with controls, and the propensity score. Both methods reveal a 
positive and significant effect of STP location on the intangible results of cooperation: location in 
an STP increases the effect by around 0.13-0.16 (almost a quarter of a standard deviation). 
This result is robust to average or first factor analysis. We found no effect of location in a park 
on the economic results from cooperation. 
The results for the control variables are presented in Table 9. First, among the general 
characteristics, size has a positive and significant effect on the intangible results of cooperation. 
Exports have a positive effect on the economic results from cooperation whereas low tech 
manufacturing and services have a negative effect. Second, for companies´ innovation activity, 
the effects of innovative effort and obstacles are positive for both results. 
Table 8: ATE estimation of location in Spanish STPs, on results from cooperation for 
innovation 
Dependent variable Effects Fac_Effects Impacts Fac_Impacts 
Means difference 
Companies in an 
STP 
1.689 0.297 1.278 0.209 
Companies 
outside  an STP 
1.479 -0.026 1.133 -0.018 
Difference 0.209
a 
(0.055) 
0.323a 
 (0.084) 
0.145a 
(0.053) 
0.228a  
(0.085) 
Regression with controls (Equation I) 0.137
b 
(0.057) 
0.212b 
(0.088) 
0.084 
(0.054) 
0.132 
(0.086) 
Regression with propensity score 
(Equation II) 
0.159a 
(0.055) 
0.247a 
(0.086) 
0.084 
0.054) 
0.133 
(0.086) 
# of observations 1820 
OLS estimations. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
a p-value lower than 0.01, b p-value lower than 0.05. 
All controls from Table 2 are included in the regressions. 
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Table 9: Results for control variables for results from cooperation for innovation 
(Equation I) 
Dependent variable Effects Fac_Effects Impacts Fac_Impacts 
G
en
er
al
 C
om
pa
ny
 C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
Company size -0.02c (0.01) -0.03c (0.02) 0.001 (0.01) 0.003 (0.02) 
Company size ^2 I 0.001b (0.00) 0.002b (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) 
Exporting behaviour -0.04 (0.08) -0.07 (0.13) 0.31a (0.09) 0.47a (0.14) 
Group -0.04 (0.03) -0.07 (0.05) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.05) 
Newly established 0.07 (0.07) 0.09 (0.11) 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.11) 
Merged -0.02 (0.10) -0.03 (0.16) 0.07 (0.11) 0.11 (0.17) 
Downsized -0.30b (0.13) -0.47b (0.21) -0.01 (0.14) -0.03 (0.22) 
low-tech 
manufacturing -0.08 (0.07) -0.12 (0.11) -0.23
a (0.07) -0.37a (0.11) 
medium-low-tech 
manufacturing 
0.02 (0.07) 0.02 (0.11) -0.07 (0.07) -0.11 (0.11) 
medium-high-tech 
manufacturing 
-0.09 (0.07) -0.14 (0.11) -0.10 (0.07) -0.16 (0.11) 
knowledge intensity 
service 
0.06 (0.06) 0.10 (0.10) -0.13b (0.06) -0.20c (0.10) 
no-knowledge intensity 
service  -0.02 (0.07) -0.04 (0.11) -0.35
a (0.07) -0.55a (0.11) 
other sectors -0.01 (0.07) -0.02 (0.12) -0.32a (0.07) -0.52a (0.12) 
In
n.
 A
ct
. Innovation effort 0.001b (0.0005) 0.001b (0.0008) 0.001b (0.0006) 0.002b (0.0007) 
Cost obstacles 0.25a (0.09) 0.38a (0.14) 0.14c (0.08) 0.20 (0.13) 
Information obstacles 0.27b (0.12) 0.41b (0.20) 0.24c (0.13) 0.39c (0.20) 
Constant  1.25a (0.10) -0.38b (0.16) 1.11a (0.10) -0.06 (0.16) 
F 4.09 a 4.14 a 6.59 a 6.47 a 
R2 0.0345 0.0348 0.0598 0.0585 
# of observations 1820 
I The size effect is mainly positive on Effects and Fac_Effects (the respective critical points are €2,103 and 
€1,769of firm sales). 
High technology manufacturing is used as the baseline category. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
a p-value lower than 0.01, b p-value lower than 0.05, c p-value lower than 0.10. 
 SSTP is included in every regression. 
 
5.3 Why park firms show better intangible results from cooperation?   
As discussed in Section 2, an important outcome of proximity is more diverse and longer lasting 
relationships. Thus, location in an STP could influence the characteristics of firm-EKS 
cooperations, which might explain why firms on STPs achieve higher intangible results from 
such cooperation. We explore this in two steps. First we regress the characteristics of the 
relationships (diversity and length) on location in an STP, and the covariates. Second, we 
include the characteristics of the relationship in the previous regression to check for changes in 
the coefficient of STP. 
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Table 10 shows the results of the first step. Location in an STP positively influences the 
diversity (by 0.4 or around one-third of a standard deviation) and length (by around 20%) of the 
relationship. 
Table 10: Influence of Spanish STPs on the characteristics of cooperation for innovation 
Dependent Variable Coefficient of SSTP 
Diversity 0.397a (0.116) 
Length 0.204a (0.069) 
# of observations 1820  /  1800 I 
OLS estimations with all the covariates. 
Standard Errors in parentheses. 
a p-value lower than 0.01. 
I If Length is the dependent variable, the number of observations is 1800.  
 
Table 11 presents the effects of adding relationship diversity and length to the regression in 
Table 8. We first include diversity and then length separately, and then include both 
characteristics together. In all three cases, diversity and length are significant at 1%, meaning 
that they positively influence the intangible results from cooperation. The coefficient of STP is 
much lower when relationship diversity is included, but is not affected by relationship length. 
This suggests that most of the effect of location in an STP on the intangible results from 
cooperation is due to more diverse relationships of firm located in an STP. 
Table 11: Effect of Spanish STPs on the intangible results from cooperation, taking 
account of diversity and length of the relationship 
Dependent variable Effects Fac_Effects 
Including Diversity   
Regression with controls 0.064 (0.051) 0.101 (0.080) 
Regression with propensity score 0.073 (0.056) 0.114 (0.087) 
Including Length   
Regression with controls 0.120b (0.057) 0.187b (0.088) 
Regression with propensity score 0.131b (0.057) 0.204b (0.089) 
Including Diversity and Length   
Regression with controls 0.063 (0.052) 0.099 (0.081) 
Regression with propensity score 0.072 (0.057) 0.114 (0.088) 
# of observations 1820  /  1800I 
OLS estimations. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
b p-value lower than 0.05. 
All controls from Table 2 are included in the regressions.  
I 1800 observations if length is included. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analysed the effect of location in an STP on the likelihood and results of cooperation 
for innovation and explored the mechanism of this influence. Previous studies analyse the 
influence of STPs on the likelihood of cooperation, using small samples of firms and STPs, and 
usually ignoring endogeneity and sample selection issues. The present study contributes by 
analysing the influence of STPs on both the likelihood of cooperation and on the results of 
cooperation. We use a very large sample of firms located in several different STPs; the 
characteristics of the data allow us to use a large set of already proven covariates and, where 
necessary, to account for endogeneity and sample selection issues. 
Our results show that location in an STP has a positive effect on the likelihood of cooperation 
for innovation. The magnitude of the difference is between 15 and 21 percentage points. This 
result extends the previous empirical evidence by showing that STPs foster formal cooperation 
by on-park firms.  
We show also that location in an STP positively affects the intangible results of cooperation with 
the firm’s main innovation partner. However, we found no effect of location in an STP on the 
economic results from cooperation. We explored why the intangible results from cooperation are 
better for park firms and found that it is likely due to the higher diversity of their relationships 
with the main partner. Several studies have highlighted the importance of diverse relationships 
with innovation partners, that include both R&D and non-R&D activities (Preissl, 2006; D’Este 
and Patel, 2007) and that non-R&D activities have a positive effect on innovation results (Barge-
Gil et al., 2011). 
It should be noted that the results from cooperation are measured over the short term so some 
caution is required when interpreting this result. It might be that, in the medium term, several 
other effects – especially economic ones – will emerge (Ham and Mowery, 1998). Another 
limitation of this study is data availability. However, both these shortcoming represent directions 
for future research. For example, it would interesting to know more about the specific 
collaboration patterns of firms located in an STP, e.g. how these collaborations are formed, the 
characteristics of collaboration partners, and the role played by the STP management in the 
collaborative relationship.  
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To sum up, we have provided evidence that location in an STP increases the likelihood of 
cooperation for innovation, and increases the intangible results from cooperation with the main 
innovation partner. Our results suggest also that the effect of STP location on the intangible 
results from cooperation is driven mainly by the more diverse relationships established by on 
park firms. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Tests of exogeneity of the treatment (SSTP) 
Dependent variable I Cooperation 
I. Wooldridge (2003)II 
vˆ coefficient -1.35ª (0.196) 
II. Hausman TestIII 
Chi2 47.11ª (0.000) 
# of observations 39722 
Icooperation = dummy: cooperation for innovation in 2005-2007. 
II Standard Errors in parentheses. ( v are residuals from the reduced form of the SSTP equation, and are 
included in the structural equation; If vˆ coefficient = 0, SSTP is exogenous). 
III Prob>chi2 in parentheses. (The null hypothesis is that SSTP is exogenous). 
a p-value lower than 0.01. 
 
